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ABSTRACT
Phishing is an increasingly prevalent social-engineering at-
tack that attempts identity theft using spoofed Web pages
of legitimate organizations. Unfortunately, current phishing
detection methods are neither complete nor responsive be-
cause they rely on user reports, and many also require client-
side software. Anti-phishing techniques could be more ef-
fective if they (1) could detect phishing attacks automati-
cally from the network traffic; (2) could operate without co-
operation from end-users. This paper performs a prelimi-
nary study to determine the feasibility of detecting phishing
attacks in real-time, from the network traffic stream itself.
We develop a model to identify the stages where in-network
phishing detection is feasible and the data sources that can
be analyzed to provide relevant information at each stage.
Based on this model, we develop and evaluate a detection
method based on features that exist in the network traffic it-
self and are correlated with confirmed phishing attacks.
1. Introduction
Many schemes to detect and prevent phishing have been
proposed over the past few years [1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 18,
19, 22, 23, 25], yet losses for victim organizations and users
due to phishing continue to mount [10]. Today, large-scale
phishing prevention primarily relies on constructing “black-
lists” of URLs from user reports (e.g., the Google Black-
list [11]). This reactive approach makes timely response to
every attack challenging, if not impossible: before a phish-
ing URL is reported, verified, and listed, many users may
have already fallen prey to the attack.
Instead, we propose a complementary, proactive approach
called Fish4Phish that detects phishing attacks from the net-
work traffic itself. Our approach involves monitoring a vari-
ety of network derived information sources, e.g., email traf-
fic, DNS information, the HTTP clickstream, and statistics
about traffic flows, and correlate these observations to de-
tect phishing attacks. This approach has several advantages
over existing schemes. First, it does not rely on user coop-
eration: Once a phishing attack is identified, all users can be
protected against it, irrespective of their client software. Sec-
ond, in-network mitigation can be applied anywhere along
the network path. Third, by correlating multiple sources of
information that are readily available inside the network, in-
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network monitoring can potentially detect phishing attacks
more quickly and more completely than existing techniques.
Fish4Phish’s detection features and heuristics are based
on a multi-stage model of phishing attacks that (i) help op-
erators reason about when, where, and how the attack might
be detected and (ii) identify various datasets associated with
each of the stages. Fish4Phish uses these features to de-
termine the likelihood that a particular URL corresponds to
a phishing attack. The model that serves as the basis for
Fish4Phish suggests all possible opportunities for detection;
an organization can tap any subset of these opportunities de-
pending on what data might be accessible or available.
In this paper, we evaluate Fish4Phish on a dataset of click-
stream URLs; consequently, we use two methods that are
applicable to this data. The primary technique is to detect
phishing URLs using automatically generated regular ex-
pressions. To reduce false positives from the regular expres-
sion matcher, we use an auxiliary heuristic: classifying Web
servers using their estimated activity periods. We make the
following contributions:
• We present a model for phishing attacks that serves as
the basis for determining data sources useful for detect-
ing phishing. The model also suggests features that can
be applied to any network that collects (or can collect)
the corresponding data.
• We evaluate Fish4Phish using data from a large access
network that provides Internet connectivity to approxi-
mately 20,000 homes. Our results show that: (i) many
users are clicking through on phishing URLs, and (ii)
a few features can be combined to provide good detec-
tion with low false positive rate.
2. Related Work
Existing phishing detection systems fall into 3 classes:
(1) client-side solutions; (2) client-server solutions; and
(3) server-side solutions. We briefly survey samples of pre-
vious work in each class to show how Fish4Phish differs
from these efforts; we also briefly discuss model and feature-
based phishing detection methods.
Client-side solutions are the most common among anti-
phishing tactics. Many of these solutions are available as
Web browser “plugins”. Spoofstick prominently alerts the
user about the current domain hosting a URL [22]. Spoof-
guard performs various checks on the URL and content of a
Web page and raises alarms on suspicious web accesses [7].
PwdHash modifies the password that is submitted to a site
as a function of the site’s domain name so that the password
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Figure 1: Model of a phishing attack. Each step has a possible detection
opportunity.
submitted to a phishing site is not the same as the one sub-
mitted to the legitimate site [6]. Fish4Phish performs similar
checks to these tools but also incorporates additional infor-
mation from the traffic stream to reduce false positives.
Client-server solutions such as Google Safe-Browsing Ex-
tension [11], Netcraft Toolbar [18], Phishtank Toolbar [19]
and “blackbox” security appliances sold by vendors that fil-
ter URLs [5, 21, 24] query blacklists to identify phishing
URLs. iTrustPage [14] uses a search engine to retrieve rep-
utation information about URLs. Although many blacklist-
based schemes have high accuracy rates, they may be slow
to list some URLs [8].
Server-side solutions such as Sitekey (a visual cue system
present on Bank of America’s sites [2]) try to increase user
awareness. Such methods often fail as users are less likely
to notice the absence of a visual indicator than its presence.
Modeling and feature-based classification of phishing
Previous work has attempted graphical modeling of phish-
ing attacks using actions and probabilities [15]; in contrast,
our model reflects macro properties for phishing that are vis-
ible in the wide-area. We study features that have been mo-
tivated in previous work. SpoofGuard uses regular expres-
sion matching [7], and others have observed that phishing
sites possess low uptimes [3, 4, 17]. Finally, previous work
has suggested looking for low DNS TTLs to detect phishing
servers using fast flux [17].
3. A Model for Phishing Attacks
In this section, we describe a model for phishing and enu-
merate the possible data sources that could be used to detect
phishing in the network. Based on this model, network oper-
ators can develop techniques for detecting phishing attacks
from various types of network data available to them.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of steps involved in a phish-
ing attack. Table 1 summarizes these detection opportuni-
ties, possible indicators of phishing attacks at each step, and
the availability of each of these datasets. We describe the
steps in our model below.
Step 1: Domain registration. Most phishing sites are
hosted on newly registered domains. Domain registration
zone file logs can expose suspicious patterns of registering
and unregistering domains. Moreover, domain names can be
tested for similarity to phishing domain names using regu-
lar expressions. Recent measurement studies have indicated
that it is indeed possible to discover phishing domain regis-
trations and de-registrations using this source [16].
Step 2: DNS update for phishing domain. Recent re-
ports indicate that phishing sites exhibit “fast flux” behav-
ior, where the mappings of both names to IP addresses and
names to authoritative nameservers are continually chang-
ing. Monitoring DNS records for a domain over time could
also allow a detection system to determine whether a partic-
ular domain was likely being used for a phishing attack. A
detection algorithm could also query the DNS to look for au-
thoritative nameservers hosted on broadband or dialup ma-
chines (or on other short-lived connections).
Step 3: Phishing email. The next step in the phishing pro-
cess is “fishing” for vulnerable users by sending out a phish-
ing email (or messages on web-based message boards and
instant messages [9, 20]), with a URL that directs users to
the newly registered domain. Emails that contain phishing
URLs could be detected either at the mail server or at an ap-
pliance that examines network traffic. An advantage to de-
tecting phishing attempts at this stage is that phishing URLs
in emails can be proactively detected, before the attack even
reaches a user’s inbox.
Step 4: DNS lookup for the phishing domain. After a
phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user may click on
a URL contained in that email. If the URL involves a DNS
lookup, monitoring these lookups provides another oppor-
tunity to detect phishing attacks. At this stage, the moni-
tor could then look for evidence of fast-flux behavior [12],
including low time-to-live (TTL) values for DNS A or NS
records, or changes to the records themselves [17].
Step 5: HTTP request for phishing Web site. A detection
mechanism could examine several features that might indi-
cate that a client was making a request to a suspect server.
First, recent studies suggest that HTTP scam and phishing
sites are typically short-lived [3, 17, 4], which suggests that
HTTP requests to Web servers with short uptimes may be
cause for suspicion. Second, the HTTP requests themselves
may provide an indication that a user is making a request for
a URL that is a likely phishing attack, because many phish-
ing URLs disguise the path (i.e., GET) portion of the URL to
be similar to a target organization’s URL. Third, looking for
HTTP requests to servers that are on IP blacklists, known
bots or compromised hosts, or otherwise “suspect” IP ad-
dresses might also prove to be helpful indicators. Finally,
request patterns such as the presence of HTTP redirects may
indicate an attempt to send a client to an ephemeral site (e.g.,
a phishing site hosted by a botnet).
Step 6: HTTP response (including content). Once the re-
quest is issued and the client follows a sequence of redirects,
a Web server returns the content to the client. This content
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Step Description Hypothesis Data Location
1 Domain registration: Phisher reg-
isters domain for hosting phishing
site.
(1) Domain names match a regular
expression that is common to phish-
ers; (2) Domain name registration /
deregistration shows large flux
Domain registration logs Registrar
2 DNS update for phishing domain:
Phisher updates DNS NS and A
records.
(1) DNS records may match a reg-
ular expression; (2) TTLs for DNS
records may be short; (3) DNS
servers IP addresses may cluster to-
wards certain prefixes.
DNS responses collected from
proactive queries of URLs in spam.
Can be collected with active mea-
surements
3 Phishing email: Phisher sends email
with content of phishing attack (in-
cluding URL).
Email contains URL whose regu-
lar expression matches a regular ex-
pression
Emails from spam traps and user
mailboxes
Local network
4 DNS lookup for phishing domain: A
user may request a phishing URL
in an email, etc., generating a DNS
lookup.
Same as 2 above Passively collected DNS queries and
records
Local network
5 HTTP request for phishing Web
site: A user’s click will generate an
HTTP request for the phishing Web
site.
(1) The HTTP request may contain
domains that match regular expres-
sions; (2) the HTTP request may in-
volve redirects
HTTP traffic “on the wire” Local network
6 HTTP response (and content):
Client receives content from
phishing Web site.
Aspects of content may resemble
content from the corresponding le-
gitimate Web site
Reassembled Web pages from
packet traces
Local network
Table 1: Steps in a phishing attack, data available for monitoring at each step, and phishing indicative behavior in each step.
is also visible in the network stream. In some cases, so-
phisticated analysis may be able to reconstruct the returned
content and compare it to that of a legitimate Web site. An
alternative method would be to look at how the page is con-
structed: for example, a phishing site might construct a page
by assembling remotely hosted content (possibly even from
the legitimate site itself).
4. Fish4Phish Features
Using the model of phishing from Section 3 as a guide,
this section evaluates the possibility of using three specific
features—URL structure, Web server activity period, and
DNS TTL values—corresponding to Steps 4 and 5 in the
model. Ultimately, an on-the-wire phishing detection sys-
tem could use other features; we focus on these three fea-
tures because the data was readily available.
4.1 URL Patterns and Structure
Phishing URLs attempt to deceive users by constructing
URLs that appear similar to the URL of the phishing victim.
To better understand URL structure, we analyzed a sample
of 1000 phishing URLs from the Google blacklist from June
2007–September 2007 and found that 86% of URLs exhib-
ited one of the following two patterns1:
1. Victim’s URL prepended to phishing URL domain.
(e.g., http://signin.ebay.com.910462.
phishsite.com/sc/saw-cgi/eBayISAPI.
dll/index.php). 573 out of the 858 identifiable
URLs had this structure.
2. Victim’s URL appears in the GET string. (e.g.,
http://phishsite.com/signin.ebay.
com/ws/eBayISAPI.php). The remaining 285
phishing URLs had this structure.
The closer a URL appears to the target organization’s
URL, the more likely it is a phishing URL. The observa-
tion that most phishing URLs conform to one of these two
1The remaining 14% of URLs were typically in one of the following cat-
egories: (i) no useful information (e.g., used an IP address), (ii) multiple
victim names in URL, or (iii) no identifiable victim name in URL.
basic structures allows us to construct a regular expression
matcher that detects almost all these URLs with few regular
expressions. Section 5 describes the design of this regular
expression matcher in detail.
4.2 Web Server Activity Period
Many Web servers that host phishing sites are short-lived:
a recent study showed that phishing sites are accessible for
3.8 days on average, and these sites are never active for
longer than 30 days [3, 4]. The short activity periods of these
Web servers likely reflect attempts to remain undetectable
and untraceable, or to evade blacklists. Accordingly, given
a likely phishing URL from the regular expression matcher,
we can eliminate false positives if the server hosting the URL
has been active for longer than some fixed period of time.
Section 5 describes this process in more detail.
4.3 TTLs of DNS records
Phishing servers may be hosted on compromised ma-
chines that are often hidden using advanced DNS tricks such
as fast-flux (or double-flux) [12, 17]. Although many legiti-
mate sites may set low TTLs, we expected that phishing sites
would typically set low DNS TTLs. To test this hypothesis,
we set up a local mail delivery agent at a spam trap to au-
tomatically pass the headers and body of each new message
to a program that extracts all URLs in the message and issue
a DNS ANY query for each domain name. The ANY query
returns the A, NS, and MX (if available) records.
5. Fish4Phish
Step 1: Whitelisting. Fish4Phish applies a two-phase
regular-expression matching algorithm to detect phishing
URLs. The whitelist matcher takes as input all URLs and
discards those URLs that have legitimate domain names
of the organizations that Fish4Phish tries to protect. The
whitelist matcher also includes popular domains such as
www.google.com in order to avoid unnecessary compu-
tation for the blacklist matcher (next step). Because we
cannot include every legitimate domain in the whitelist,
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Fish4Phish whitelists domains that either receive a substan-
tial amount of traffic or commonly appear in the list of false
positives after blacklist matching, based on feedback.
Step 2: Blacklisting. From the remaining set of non-
whitelisted URLs, the blacklist matcher searches for all
URLs similar to target organizations’ URLs. The black-
list matcher checks both parts of a URL—the domain
name and the HTTP GET/POST string—for similarity with
each target organization’s URL. The blacklist matcher gives
a higher score to a URL that matches more clauses in
the regular expression. For example, (signin|cgi|
secure)?(.?)(ebay)(.?)(com)?.+([[:digit:
]]+)? is a simplified version of the blacklist expression
that looks for Ebay phishing in the domain name of a URL.
[[:digit:]] represents the character class containing
digits. Two URLs that match this regular expression are
ebay.doubleclick.net and signin.ebay.com.
phishsite.com. The second URL matches more clauses
in the regular expression and will receive a higher score,
even if we know nothing about the legitimacy of either do-
main. A URL which matches no clause receives a zero score.
Step 3: Whitelisting feedback. Given only an ini-
tial seed whitelist, the blacklist matcher generates
many false positives. Common examples of such
false positives are advertisement domains that use
keywords of target organizations to personalize their
ads, e.g., http://ebay.doubleclick.net
may trigger a regular expression that looks for
http://ebay.phishsite.com. We periodically
update the Fish4Phish whitelist to reduce the number of
false positives that result from the blacklist. To reduce false
positives, Fish4Phish incorporates feedback from users or
operators about false positive URLs. These reports are
incorporated into the whitelist. We show in Section 6.2 that
this mechanism for tuning the whitelist dramatically reduces
the false positive rate over time.
Step 4: Reducing false positives based on server activity.
Fish4Phish uses the activity period for a Web server to re-
duce false positives. The first step in determining a server’s
activity period is to map the potential phishing URL to a
corresponding server’s IP address. When HTTP requests
can be directly monitored, obtaining this mapping is trivial:
the packets on the wire containing the GET request contain
the destination IP address of the server. Given the IP ad-
dress of the Web server corresponding to a URL, the sec-
ond step involves estimating the time interval over which
the server was active. Fish4Phish relies on passive moni-
toring of TCP flow to determine the length of time a server
has served connections from clients. This measurement pro-
vides a lower bound on the time interval for which the server
has been active (i.e., we can say that the server has been ac-
tive for at least that period of time). Using this lower bound,
Fish4Phish eliminates potential false positives by removing
servers from suspicion if they have been active for a period
much longer than typical phishing server uptimes (typically
a few days).
URLs Domains Servers Clients
Verified Phishing 227 34 26 64
False Positives 20,668 831 4,589 6,214
Table 2: URLs matched by the URL structure feature.
For each IP address, Fish4Phish maintains a start and end
time (i.e., the time a request was first seen to that IP address,
and the time it was last seen). In practice, both TCP flow
logs and traffic flow statistics are sampled. The effects of
this sampling, however, will only cause Fish4Phish to un-
derestimate a server’s activity period, making the server less
likely to be thrown out as a false positive.
6. Evaluation
We evaluate the features from Section 4 using HTTP click-
stream data from an access network, and DNS data from a
large campus network. We investigate whether: (1) Our fea-
tures can detect more phishing URLs than publicly avail-
able sources such Google Blacklist; (2) The features detect
phishing URLs faster than Google Blacklist; (3) Combina-
tions of features reduce false positive results. We also evalu-
ated a third feature—whether DNS TTLs might be useful for
distinguishing phishing domains from legitimate ones. Al-
though we do not present the results here due to space con-
straints, we found, contrary to both our expectation and sug-
gestions from recent previous work [17], that low DNS TTL
values do not appear to be useful for distinguishing phishing
URLs from legitimate ones.
6.1 Data
We collect HTTP clickstream data from an access network
of an ISP, representing approximately 20,000 home user ac-
counts, from October 21–28, 2007. Each line of the data
contains one HTTP header (e.g., ‘Host’, ‘GET’, ‘Referer’,
‘User-agent’, etc.), a high-resolution timestamp, and a 4-
tuple comprising the source and destination IP addresses and
ports.
Because of bandwidth limitations at the data collection
node, we were unable to independently look for the two rel-
evant features: the URL structure feature and activity period
feature. Instead, we apply only the URL pattern matching
on the clickstream data at the collection node, and record
each URL (and its corresponding flow 4-tuple) that received
any non-negative score (and not necessarily a high score).
We perform this step primarily to reduce the volume of data
so that the resulting logs can be further analyzed. Over the
8-day analysis period, the URL structure classifier flagged
20,895 URLs from 865 unique domain names 2.
To estimate server activity periods, we examine TCP flow
logs and produce a hourly summary for every destination
IP that contains the time, mean inter-arrival time, standard
deviation of inter-arrival time distribution, and number of
2The domain name for a URL is obtained from the ‘Host: ’ HTTP header
field. We examine only the part of the domain that uniquely identifies an
organization, which is usually the last two or last three portions of the dot-
separated domain name. For example, www1.bbc.co.uk and www2.
bbc.co.uk have different absolute domain names, but the portion that
identifies the organization, bbc.co.uk, is the same for both. A domain
name comprising only an IP address is used as is.
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Phishing Legitimate
Day phish FPs # WL FP Rate
(Detections) (Alerts)
1 7 131 1857 .071
2 12 143 2208 .065
3 11 117 2733 .043
4 26 121 2981 .041
5 3 88 1957 .045
6 39 66 3771 .018
7 13 74 2815 .026
8 116 91 1515 .060
Totals 227 831 19,837
Table 3: Statistics of alerts raised each day. “phish” indicates alerts
that correspond to detected phishing attempts; there were no missed
detections. FPs are URL alerts that were subsequently whitelisted. WL
shows the URLs that were automatically whitelisted without ever gen-
erating an alert.
unique remote IPs that connected to it. We join this data with
the IPs of servers hosting URLs that were flagged using the
regular expression matcher.
Ideally, we would have estimates of each Web server’s
activity period before a URL corresponding to that server
appears in the clickstream (in practice, the classifier would
operate on history of the server’s uptime). Unfortunately,
we possess TCP flow logs only for the same time period
as the clickstream logs, so we cannot see a server’s history
prior to a click. Instead, we use the flow information to see
whether the activity periods of phishing servers are signif-
icantly lower than activity periods of servers hosting false
positive URLs.
6.2 Results
Summary. Fish4Phish detected 227 unique phishing URLs
from 34 distinct domains, hosted on 26 distinct servers. Ta-
ble 2 shows, for both phishing and non-phishing URLs, the
number of URLs detected, unique domains for these URLs,
distinct server IPs hosting these URLs, and distinct client IPs
that accessed these URLs.
URL pattern matcher. Fish4Phish’s URL pattern match-
ing mechanism dynamically updates its whitelist based on
reports of false positives (i.e., by a network operator, or
based on user reports). We emulate this behavior as fol-
lows. We begin with an empty domain name whitelist, pro-
ceed over the URL log files chronologically, and as the sys-
tem raises alerts for URLs that are false positives, we add
the domain name to the whitelist (so all further URLs un-
der that domain will be automatically whitelisted). At the
end of each day’s log, we count the number of URLs that
were (1) verified as phishing, (2) automatically whitelisted,
or (3) generated false positives given the state of the dynamic
whitelist at that time.
Table 3 illustrates these statistics for the first 8 days of our
trace. Our analysis shows that steadily whitelisting domains
reduces potential for false positives when those domains re-
appear. To confirm the trend of decreasing false positive
rates, we performed the same analysis on a longer period
of 35 days, from October 21–November 25, 2007. Figure 2
plots the false positive rates across the longer trace; false














Figure 2: The false positive rate for phishing alerts decreases as the
















Maximum Activity Period (days)
Servers of verified phishing URLs
Servers of all FP URLs
Servers of alerted FPs on day 1
Figure 3: Activity periods for servers that hosted a phishing URL,
a false positive URL before dynamic whitelisting, and a false positive
URL (on the first day) after whitelisting.
0.7% within just over a month. There is a jump in false pos-
itive rate on day 8 because false positive rate is computed as
(# of FPs)/(# of whitelisted domains), and the num-
ber of whitelisted domains on day 8 was also low for an un-
known reason. This discrepancy indicates that, if entirely
new domains appear, the number of false positives may stay
steady or even grow. The whitelisting approach does, how-
ever, appear to be critical: without user feedback (i.e., given
only a static whitelist), false positive rates can be as high as
96%; with user feedback, the number of false positives is
much lower.
Providing feedback to the whitelist appears cumbersome,
but three aspects suggest that this approach may be man-
ageable. First, the number of URLs that required manual
classification (i.e., phishing URLs + false positive URLs) is
low compared to the number of URLs that were automati-
cally classified with the whitelist. Second, this classification
might be done by users who report this relatively small num-
ber of false positives (similar to how users today have toolbar
extensions to report email spam missed by filters). Finally,
the false positive rate for URLs (i.e., number of false pos-
itives per number of negative instances) steadily decreases:
as the dynamic whitelist adds more false positive domains,
more URLs that would have required human intervention
with only a static whitelist can be skipped automatically.
Reducing false positives. We compare the activity peri-
ods of Web servers that we have verified as phishing sites
to: (1) servers corresponding to false positives (i.e., legiti-
mate Web sites), which allows us to compare how well this
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feature performs in isolation; and (2) only the set of false
positive URLs that were flagged by the first feature, which
allows us to evaluate the extent to which this feature might
perform for reducing the false positives that were flagged by
the URL structure classifier. For the latter case, we use only
the first day of false positive URLs, since all of the false pos-
itive URLs observed on the first day that escaped whitelist-
ing could have feasibly been active for the remainder of trace
period (i.e., as long as 7 additional days).
Figure 3 shows that the average activity period for phish-
ing servers is lower than activity periods of all servers host-
ing false positive URLs (i.e., legitimate Web servers): even
without applying URL matching, setting a maximum thresh-
old for activity period for phishing servers to 5.5 days elim-
inates more than 60% of false positive URLs while retain-
ing almost 70% of phishing URLs. Using the activity-
period threshold-based classification after applying dynamic
whitelisting is more effective: the same threshold of 5.5 days
eliminates 85% of false positives.3
Comparison with Google blacklist To determine the com-
pleteness and responsiveness of Fish4Phish relative to the
Google blacklist, we compared the phishing URLs found by
Fish4Phish with logs of the Google Anti-Phishing blacklist
from October 21–31, 2007. Of the 34 unique phishing do-
mains that Fish4Phish found during this period, only 7 do-
mains were listed on Google’s blacklist, all of which were
listed on October 31 or later: Fish4Phish detected all of
these URLs at least 2 days before the Google blacklist.
7. Conclusion
This paper has presented Fish4Phish, a set of techniques
for detecting phishing attacks in network traffic. In con-
trast to existing techniques, which rely primarily on user
reports and manual verification, Fish4Phish’s detection is
automatic: it monitors network traffic (e.g., HTTP click-
streams, spam traps) to detect phishing attacks before they
become listed in commonly used blacklists. Fish4Phish’s
detection heuristics are based on a model of phishing attacks
that identifies opportunities for network operators to detect
phishing attacks using a combination of various datasets.
Our model of phishing presents heuristics and features that
may prove useful for detecting phishing attacks from net-
work traffic using the methods we have presented or pos-
sibly a more sophisticated classifier. Fish4Phish uses dy-
namic regular expression matching of URLs and a combina-
tion heuristics to reduce false positives.
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